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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUSAN H. EARLY, 
Respondent/Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID W. EARLY, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Supreme Court No. 8903 06-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2A-3(2)(h). 
II. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of 
Respondent Susan H. Early ("Mrs. Early") and against Appellant 
David W. Early ("Mr. Early") for certain sums which Mr. Early 
was required to pay pursuant to prior orders of the court, 
including real estate taxes accruing prior to the Decree of 
Divorce in the amount of $3325.00, and from the court's denial 
of Mr. Early's request for a judgment for certain sums allegedly 
owed him by Mrs. Early. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review by this 
appeal: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
entering judgment against Mr. Early for the amount of property 
taxes on the former residence of the parties which accrued prior 
to the entry of the Decree of Divorce which the court had 
previously ordered Mr. Early to pay? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Early for sums he 
allegedly paid for Mrs. Early's bills prior to the time he 
released all claims against Mrs. Early? 
3. Did the district court in entering the Judgment 
against Mr. Early violate the provisions of Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires a brief written 
statement setting forth the grounds of a decision with respect 
to certain motions? 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Proceedings Below. 
A Decree of Divorce was entered in favor of Mrs. Early 
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in October, 1988. Thereafter, in February, 1988, Mrs. Early 
filed a Motion for Order of Contempt and Judgment for Mr. 
Early's failure to pay various sums he was required to pay under 
prior orders of the court, including real property taxes on the 
former residence of the parties which accrued prior to the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce. Mr. Early, in turn, filed his own 
Motion for Entry of Judgment against Mrs. Early on the purported 
basis that she had failed to pay certain obligations. 
On April 17, 1989, the court, the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat, entered judgment in favor of Mrs. Early in the sum of 
$7424.87 and denied Mr. Early's request for judgment. Mr. Early 
filed his Notice of Appeal from the Order and Judgment on May 
12, 1989. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Mrs. Early filed this divorce proceeding on November 
25, 1986. [R. 2] 
2. In March, 1987, Mrs. Early filed an Order to Show 
Cause concerning temporary alimony, child support and other 
interim matters. On March 30, 1987, Commissioner Sandra Peuler 
issued her recommendations. Insofar as relevant to the present 
appeal, the Commissioner recommended that Mr. Early be 
responsible for payment of property taxes accruing on the 
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residence of the parties pending final resolution of the case. 
Specifically, the recommendations provided that Mr. Early 
"maintain the mortgage, tax and insurance payments on the 
parties1 home during the pendency of this action." [R. 318-319] 
3. On June 24, 1987, Judge Moffat approved the 
Commissioners recommendations, thereby ordering that Mr. Early 
was responsible for property taxes accruing on the residence 
prior to final resolution of the matter. [R. 398] 
4. After several days of trial in August, 1988, the 
parties were able to resolve all disputes between them with the 
exception of certain payments, now here at issue, which Mrs. 
Early contended Mr. Early was obligated to pay by prior order of 
the court. Accordingly, on October 13, 1988 when the parties 
signed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, Mrs. 
Early expressly preserved the claim by providing that her 
obligation to pay debts incurred by her since separation of the 
parties excepted those which Mr. Early was required to pay 
pursuant to previous court orders. Specifically, paragraph 12 
of the agreement provided: 
The Plaintiff [Mrs. Early] agrees to assume 
and pay the separate debts and obligations which 
she has incurred subsequent to the separation of 
the parties, excepting those which, by Order of the 
Court, Defendant is obligated to pay, and agrees to 
indemnify and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. [Emphasis Added] [R. 789] 
5. On October 26, 1988, the parties entered into a very 
broad Mutual Release insisted upon by Mr. Early by which the 
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parties released each other from any claims whatsoever except 
such rights and obligations as were specifically provided in the 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and the Decree of 
Divorce to be entered, [R. 802] 
6. Thereafter, on October 28, 1988, the court entered 
a Decree of Divorce. Paragraph 13 of that Decree required Mr. 
Early to pay obligations for which he was responsible pursuant 
to previous orders of the court. Specifically, the Decree 
provided: 
The Plaintiff [Mrs. Early] shall assume and 
pay the separate debts and obligations which she 
has incurred subsequent to the separation of the 
parties, excepting those which, by previous Order 
of the Court, Defendant is obligated to pay, and 
shall indemnify and hold the Defendant harmless 
therefrom. [Emphasis Added] [R. 77 6] 
7. Mr. Early failed to pay various amounts which he was 
required to pay pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the 
previous order of the court, including the sum of $3 3 2 5.00 
representing the prorated amount of property taxes accrued on 
the residence through the date the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. Accordingly, in February, 1989, Mrs. Early filed a 
Motion for Order of Contempt and Judgment requesting that the 
court enter judgment for these amounts. [R. 875] 
8. Mr. Early then filed his own motion asking that 
judgment be entered in his favor for a net amount of $11,344.84 
on the purported basis that prior to the entry of the divorce 
5 
decree he had paid various bills owed by Mrs. Early which she 
allegedly incurred after the separation of the parties. [R. 905 
and 909] 
9. After taking the matter under advisement, the 
district court issued a minute entry dated March 28, 1989 
finding that a judgment should be entered in favor of Mrs. Early 
in the sum of $7424.87 and denying Mr. Early's request for 
judgment. The minute entry specifically provided: 
The Court finds that the Defendant [Mr. Early] 
has failed to make payments and perform pursuant to 
the terms of the Stipulation and the Judgment based 
thereon. The Court therefore finds that a judgment 
in the sum of $7424.87 should be entered against 
Defendant in favor of Plaintiff. The basis of this 
is, inter alia, as set forth in the supporting 
Memorandum of the Plaintiff. The Court further 
finds that the Reply Memorandum and claim for 
offset by the Defendant, together with his request 
for attorney's fees should be denied, there being 
no basis therefor... [R. 919] 
10. On April 17, 1989, the court entered its Order and 
Judgment in favor of Mrs. Early in the sum of $7424.87. [R. 
925] 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
entered into between the parties and the Decree of Divorce 
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entered by the court both specifically provided that Mr. Early 
remained responsible for any debts and obligations he was 
required to pay pursuant to previous orders of the court. The 
court's previous order obligated Mr. Early to pay all property 
taxes accruing during the pendency of the action. The fact that 
the real property taxes for the year 1988 were not actually 
delinquent until November 30, 1988, after the divorce decree was 
entered is irrelevant. Those taxes were accruing each month 
during the pendency of the action. In any event, Mr. Early has 
absolutely failed to show any abuse of discretion in the 
district court's interpretation of its own order as requiring 
Mr. Early to pay the taxes. 
2. Mr. Early was not entitled to recover any amounts 
which he allegedly paid prior to the entry of the divorce decree 
on Mrs. Early's bills because he released any such claims by 
virtue of the Mutual Release which he signed on October 26, 
1988. 
3. The district court was not required to issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision under Rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as Mrs. Early's 
motion was not one under Rules 12(b), 50(a) or (b), 56 or 59. 
In any event, the district court did in fact issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Entering Judgment in Favor of Mrs. Early. 
Paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce specifically 
recognized Mr. Early's continuing obligation to pay debts 
previously ordered by the court. In response to Mrs. Early's 
motion for entry of judgment, the court determined that Mr. 
Early was obligated by the prior court order to pay the taxes on 
the residence. Mr. Early essentially argues on this appeal that 
the district court misinterpreted its own previous order 
requiring Mr. Early to be responsible for property taxes 
accruing on the parties' home during the pendency of the action. 
Mr. Early erroneously argues that because under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. , Section 59-2-1325, the taxes were not 
delinguent until November 30, 1988, that he had no obligation to 
pay that portion of the 1988 property taxes which accrued prior 
to October 28, 1988, the date the Decree of Divorce was entered. 
The district court properly rejected this mischaracterization of 
its prior order. 
Taxes were accruing on the residence each day that this 
lawsuit was pending, regardless of when the taxes became 
delinquent. In fact, the taxes were a lien upon the residence 
as of January 1, 1988. Utah Code Ann. , Section 59-2-1303. The 
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situation is no different in principle than when an owner sells 
his home during the year prior to the time taxes are delinquent. 
The seller is responsible for payment of those taxes which 
attached as a lien to the property prior to the sale date. 
Similarly, if Mrs, Early incurred a credit card charge one week 
before the separation of the parties which wasn't billed by the 
credit card company until a month later and wasn't delinquent 
until two months later, Mr. Early would hardly be heard to argue 
that Mrs. Early is responsible for the bill as one she incurred 
after separation. The determinative factor is not when an item 
of expense is delinquent, but when it was incurred. In any 
event, even if there were some ambiguity in the court's prior 
order in this regard, the district court was in the best 
position to rule on the meaning of its prior order. Mr. Early 
has presented absolutely no evidence or basis for a finding that 
the district court abused its discretion in this regard. See, 
e.g., Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Refusing to Enter Judgment in Favor of Mr. Early. 
As previously stated, Mr. Early sought judgment against 
Mrs. Early on the basis that prior to the Decree of Divorce 
being entered he had paid various bills which she incurred after 
separation of the parties. However, the Mutual Release which 
Mr. Early signed on October 26, 1988, after he supposedly paid 
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these sums, specifically released any such claims. That Release 
provided in part: 
[T]he said parties and each of them, do hereby 
release and forever discharge the other of, from, 
and against any and all claims, demands, causes of 
action, obligations, damages, and liabilities of 
any nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, 
suspected or claimed, which they, and each of them, 
ever had, now have, or may hereafter have or claim 
to have against the other, whether known or 
unknown, including, specifically, but not 
exclusively, and without limiting the generality of 
the foregoing, any and all claims and causes of 
action, based on, or in any manner arising out of 
the marriage relationship of the parties, or any 
other relationship, existing prior thereto, or in 
any manner connected therewith. [R. 802] 
Because Mr. Early paid the expenses he seeks to charge to Mrs. 
Early before he signed the Release, his claim is clearly barred 
by the Release. 
Mr. Early asserts in his brief that Mrs. Early is 
claiming "The best of both worlds — no obligations on her part 
to Mr. Early, but he owing her everything." [Appellant's Brief, 
p. 15] Mrs. Early is claiming nothing of the sort. Mrs. Early 
simply claims that Mr. Early is bound by the agreements signed 
by the parties, the Decree of Divorce entered by the district 
court, and the court's prior order. Mr. Early's claim for 
reimbursement of bills paid prior to the Release is clearly 
barred by its express language. On the other hand, the Release 
specifically preserved Mrs. Early's rights under the Property 
Settlement Agreement and Decree of Divorce, which in turn both 
specifically required Mr. Early to pay all debts he had been 
previously ordered to pay. Mr. Early never bargained for or 
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received any such reservation of rights. If, at the time the 
Release was signed, Mr. Early had a claim that he had paid debts 
incurred by Mrs. Early since separation of the parties, that 
matter should have been raised by Mr. Early as part of the 
negotiations, rather than months later in a belated attempt to 
evade his obligations under the Decree of Divorce and previous 
court order. 
C. The Court's Judgment Did Not Violate Rule 52(a). 
Finally, Mr. Early asserts that the court violated the 
provisions of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by 
supposedly failing to issue a brief written statement of the 
basis for its ruling. This contention is frivolous. 
In the first place, the court was not required to issue 
a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on a 
motion for entry of judgment for failure to pay amounts required 
by previous orders of the court. Rule 52(a) only requires a 
written statement where motions are granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b) , 56 and 59. Mrs. Early's motion was not made 
under any of those rules. Further, Rule 52(a) only requires a 
written statement when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. In the case at bar, Mrs. Early's motion with respect to 
the taxes which Mr. Early challenges was only made on one ground 
— that is that Mr. Early had failed to pay the taxes he was 
required to pay by previous court order. 
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Second, in its March 28, 1989 Minute Entry granting Mrs. 
Early judgment, the district court did in fact state the basis 
of its ruling. The court specifically stated that: 
The court finds that the Defendant has failed 
to make payments and perform pursuant to the terms 
of the Stipulation and the Judgment based 
thereon. * . The basis of this is, inter alia, as set 
forth in the supporting Memorandum of the 
Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly held that Mr. Early was 
obligated to pay the taxes on the parties1 former residence and 
that Mr. Early had released any claim relating to bills which he 
paid prior to the execution of the Mutual Release. Mr. Early 
has not even approached meeting his burden of demonstrating an 
abuse of discretion by the district court in its interpretation 
of the parties1 agreements and the court's prior orders. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the district 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this f) day of November, 1989. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
js early\brief 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed four 
(4) copies of the within Brief of Respondent to the following 
party by depositing the same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, 
q rjk. 
this _J day of November, 1989: 
Brant H. Wall, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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